The Content of Inference

Abstract

Inferentialism is the view that representational content is explained by linguistic or mental states interacting according to inferential rules. Mendelovici's and Bourget's swapping argument against inferentialism shows that rules of inference do not sufficiently constrain content. This paper argues that their argument can be further strengthened so that its conclusion yields that the content and inferential roles are strictly independent. It is then argued that this conclusion is untenable and that the argument, rather than undermining inferentialism, corrodes the model-theoretic foundations of standard philosophical semantics. The paper concludes with some hints towards an alternative semantic paradigm inspired by intuitionistic type-theory that is immune to the swapping argument.

Author's Profile

Peter Kuhn
Goethe University Frankfurt

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2024-10-30

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