Kant’s Definition of Sensation

Kant Studies Online 2014:262-311 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

My aim in this essay is to clarify certain issues relating to Kant’s definition of sensation. I will argue that even though sensation can occur in Kant’s system only if the subject is physiologically affected by some kind of object, Kant defines sensation non-referentially, that is, as relating entirely to the subject without reference to the affecting object. In the process, I will also demonstrate that sensation for Kant is the feeling accompanying the non-durational and obscurely conscious alteration or modification in the representational state of the subject.

Author's Profile

Apaar Kumar
School of Arts and Sciences, Ahmedabad University

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-01-18

Downloads
14 (#99,351)

6 months
11 (#98,609)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?