Expressivism and Innocent Mistakes

Ethics 124 (2):370-383 (2014)
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Abstract
Allan Gibbard maintains that his plan-based expressivism allows for a particular type of innocent mistake: I can agree that your plan to X makes sense (say, because it was based on advice from someone you trust), while nonetheless insisting that it is incorrect (e.g., because you chose a bad advisor). However, Steve Daskal has recently argued that there are significant limitations in Gibbard’s account of how we can be mistaken about the normative judgments we make. This essay refines Gibbard’s account in order to show--contra Daskal--that expressivists can deliver a surprisingly robust form of normative objectivity.
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First archival date: 2013-10-05
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