Summa Contra Scepticos

Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):184-193 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
This critical notice concerns Duncan Pritchard's Epistemic Angst. After a summary of the book, I offer some brief critical comments on five issues: the distinction between overriding and undercutting strategies against scepticism, epistemic relativism, foundationalist hinge epistemology, the relationship between hinge propositions and evidence, and the universality of rational evaluation. Epistemic Angst is Duncan Pritchard's to-date most comprehensive attempt to defuse Cartesian epistemic scepticism. The argument builds on Pritchard's more than sixty previous publications on the same general topic. Given limitations of space, this critical notice will nevertheless focus on Epistemic Angst alone. I shall also confine myself to a discussion of Pritchard's own position, leaving aside his criticisms of other views.
No keywords specified (fix it)
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-09-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 10 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
51 ( #33,768 of 42,302 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
22 ( #26,017 of 42,302 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.