Escepticismo y Desacuerdo

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Abstract
Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes.
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Archival date: 2012-10-03
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2012-10-03

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