Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles

Philosophical Studies 176 (3):693-707 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LAMWOT
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-01-02
View other versions
Added to PP index
2018-01-02

Total views
476 ( #16,183 of 71,190 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #34,113 of 71,190 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.