Wierenga on theism and counterpossibles

Philosophical Studies 176 (3):693-707 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LAMWOT
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-01-02
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 26 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-01-02

Total views
250 ( #16,094 of 46,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
94 ( #6,664 of 46,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.