A Uniform, Concretist Metaphysics for Linguistic Types

Metaphysica 20 (2):195-221 (2019)
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I argue that it is not acceptable to restrict the claim that linguistic types are concrete entities to some categories of linguistic types, while at the same time conceding that other categories of linguistic types are abstract entities. Moreover, I suggest a way in which type-concretism can be extended to every linguistic type, thereby responding to the so-called productivity objection to type-concretism, according to which, whenever tokens of a type t are produced in different, causally isolated circumstances, then t needs to be identified by a certain form or structure. This extension of type-concretism detaches type-concretism from so-called originalism and gives rules a prominent role in type-concretism.
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Archival date: 2019-10-24
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