Knowledge judgements and cognitive psychology

Synthese (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Certain well-known intuitions suggest that, contrary to traditional thinking in epistemology, knowledge judgements are shifty—i.e., that judgements about whether somebody knows something can shift in stringency with context. Some take these intuitions to show that knowledge judgements are shifty. Jennifer Nagel and Mikkel Gerken have argued, however, that closer attention to the psychological processes which underlie knowledge judgements shows how traditional non-shifty thinking can be preserved. They each defend moderate classical invariantism—the view that the epistemic standard for knowing is always moderate—by drawing on recent work in cognitive psychology. This paper argues that neither attempt succeeds.
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Archival date: 2018-07-31
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References found in this work BETA
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
The Reliability of Epistemic Intuitions.Boyd, Kenneth & Nagel, Jennifer

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2018-07-21

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