Similarity, continuity and survival

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):3 – 18 (1975)
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The paper defends the claim that it is metaphysically possible that continuants of at least some kinds can have life-histories that incorporate temporal gaps -- i.e., the continuants can go out of existence and then come into existence again. Opponents of this view have included Graham Nerlich and Bernard Williams, whose writings I discuss.i
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