Unwitting Self‐Awareness?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):719-726 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This is a contribution to a book symposium on Joelle Proust’s The Philosophy of Metacognition: Mental Agency and Self-Awareness (OUP). While there is much to admire in Proust’s book, the legitimacy of her distinction between “procedural” and “analytic” metacognition can be questioned. Doing so may help us better understand the relevance of animal metacognition studies to human self-knowledge.

Author's Profile

Peter Langland-Hassan
University of Cincinnati


Added to PP

569 (#21,277)

6 months
75 (#34,655)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?