Are psychopaths moral‐psychologically impaired? Reassessing emotion‐theoretical explanations

Mind and Language 37 (2):177-193 (2022)
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Abstract

Psychopathy has been theorized as a disorder of emotion, which impairs moral judgments. However, these theories are increasingly being abandoned as empirical studies show that psychopaths seem to make proper moral judgments. In this contribution, these findings are reassessed, and it is argued that prevalent emotion‐theories of psychopathy appear to operate with the unjustified assumption that psychopaths have no emotions, which leads to the hypothesis that psychopaths are completely unable to make moral judgments. An alternative and novel explanation is proposed, theorizing psychopathy as a degree‐specific emotional deficiency, which causes degree‐specific differences in moral judgments.

Author's Profile

Rasmus Rosenberg Larsen
University of Toronto at Mississauga

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