Margaret Cavendish on Human Beings

In Karolina Hübner (ed.), Human: A History (Oxford Philosophical Concepts). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 168-194 (2022)
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Abstract

Margaret Cavendish is a vitalist, materialist, and monist. She holds that human beings and other natural kinds are parts of the one material entity she calls “nature.” While she thinks that human beings may not be superior to other animals in many ways, she does argue that human beings have a type of knowledge and perception that is unique to their kind, that they strive for the continuance of their being, and that they join together into societies in order to achieve a more peaceful existence. In what follows, we will give a brief overview of Cavendish’s metaphysics of nature, and then turn to her metaphysics of human beings. We will consider the formation of human beings, how their perception and knowledge differ from other nonhuman animals, how human beings are individuated, and in what sense they can be immortal. Finally, we will turn to her social and political views of human beings. In the end, we will argue, contra current scholarship, that Cavendish’s views about the social nature of the human beings mirror her views about the metaphysical structure of nature. In particular, we show that Cavendish embraces both natural and social hierarchy as well as a form of sexual equality that we dub “Platonic feminism.”

Author Profiles

Marcy P. Lascano
University of Kansas
Eric Schliesser
University of Amsterdam

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