Moral Realism, Speech Act Diversity, and Expressivism

Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):166-174 (2019)
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Abstract
In his highly engaging book, Speech and Morality, Terence Cuneo advances a transcendental argument for moral realism from the fact that we speak. After summarizing the major moves in the book, I argue that its master argument is not as friendly to non-naturalist versions of moral realism as Cuneo advertises and relies on a diet of insufficient types of speech acts. I also argue that expressivists have compelling replies to each of Cuneo's objections individually, but taken together, Cuneo's objections provide the resources for issuing a new and interesting challenge to expressivists.
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Archival date: 2019-02-25
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