Perspectives and Good Dispositions

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


I begin with various cases that have been used to motivate the need for a more “subjective” kind of evaluation, and accompanying norms, in both the practical and theoretical domains. I outline a broad paradigm for thinking about such evaluations, which I call perspectivist. According to this paradigm, what one ought to do and believe is fixed by one’s perspective, which is a kind of representation of the world (e.g. the propositions constituting one’s evidence). My purpose is to sketch and defend an alternative framework. I first sketch how what I call dispositional evaluations work, and the kinds of evaluative norms they give rise to (roughly: ‘Manifest good dispositions!’). I then argue that my view has several advantages: it can avoid a range of problems faced by perspectivist views, and it provides a unified picture of (evaluative) norms governing actions, choices, and beliefs. A broader theme that emerges is that a perspectivist focus on issues of epistemic access, or on what is present to an agent’s mind, may prevent us from seeing the full range of options available: too often both sides of various disputes (e.g. internalists and externalists) have been locked in what is essentially a perspectivist framework.

Author's Profile

Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
University of Helsinki


Added to PP

367 (#26,112)

6 months
122 (#7,902)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?