Resisting Reductive Realism

In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. They also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why provides further evidence for a kind of hybrid view of normative concept use.
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Archival date: 2019-06-11
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