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Resisting Reductive Realism
In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 96 - 117 (2020)
Abstract
Ethicists struggle to take reductive views seriously. They also have trouble conceiving of some supervenience failures. Understanding why provides further evidence for a kind of hybrid view of normative concept use.Author's Profile
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2019-06-11
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137 (#22,242)
2019-06-11
Downloads
816 (#16,493)
6 months
137 (#22,242)
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