Single premise deduction and risk

Philosophical Studies 141 (2):157 - 173 (2008)
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Abstract
It is tempting to think that multi premise closure creates a special class of paradoxes having to do with the accumulation of risks, and that these paradoxes could be escaped by rejecting the principle, while still retaining single premise closure. I argue that single premise deduction is also susceptible to risks. I show that what I take to be the strongest argument for rejecting multi premise closure is also an argument for rejecting single premise closure. Because of the symmetry between the principles, they come as a package: either both will have to be rejected or both will have to be revised.
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First archival date: 2013-12-05
Latest version: 2 (2013-12-05)
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemic Luck.Pritchard, Duncan
Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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Citations of this work BETA
Very Improbable Knowing.Williamson, Timothy
Justified Inference.Wedgwood, Ralph
Free Will Agnosticism.Kearns, Stephen

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2009-01-28

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