Concepts and conceptual analysis

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):253-282 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether.

Author Profiles

Eric Margolis
University of British Columbia
Stephen Laurence
University of Sheffield

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
1,447 (#6,905)

6 months
384 (#4,594)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?