Abstract
The suppression thesis is the theological claim that theistic non-belief results from culpable mistreatment
of one’s knowledge of God or one’s evidence for God. The thesis is a traditional one
but unpopular today. This article examines whether it can gain new credibility from the philosophy
of self-deception and from the cognitive science of religion. The thesis is analysed in terms of the
intentionalist and the non-intentionalist model of self-deception. The first proposed model views
non-belief as intentional suppression of one’s implicit knowledge of God. It is less feasible psychologically
but has a good theological fit with Paul’s and Calvin’s versions of the thesis. This model also
helps the argument for the culpability of non-belief. The second model views suppression as a process
of subconscious motivated reasoning driven by a desire to avoid an uncomfortable truth. It fits
Pascal’s view that one’s desire for or against God determines whether one sees general revelation as
providing sufficient evidence for God. There is some empirical and anecdotal evidence for both
models, but obvious cases of non-resistant non-belief present a major problem for the suppression
thesis. Also, it is hard to see what might motivate anyone to deceive oneself about God’s existence.