Fogelin’s Theory of Deep Disagreements: A Relativistic Reading

Philosophical Investigations 43 (4):346-362 (2020)
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Abstract

In “The Logic of Deep Disagreements,” Robert Fogelin claims that parties to a deep disagreement lack the common ground needed for arguments to work, making the disagreement impervious to rational resolution. Although Fogelin’s article received numerous responses, there has been no attempt to elucidate the epistemological theory behind Fogelin’s theses. In this article, I examine Fogelin’s theory of deep disagreements in light of his broader philosophy. The picture that emerges is that of relativism of distance, à la Bernard Williams. By interpreting Fogelin’s theory as relativism of distance, it avoids some of the critiques that have been raised against it.

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Victoria Lavorerio
Universidad de la Republica

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