Agency in Social Context

Res Philosophica 94 (4):471-498 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Many political philosophers argue that interference threatens a person’s agency. And they cast political freedom in opposition to interpersonal threats to agency, as non-interference. I argue that this approach relies on an inapt model of agency, crucial aspects of which emerge from our relationships with other people. Such relationships involve complex patterns of vulnerability and subjection, essential to our constitution as particular kinds of agents: as owners of property, as members of families, and as participants in a market for labor. We should construct a conception of freedom that targets the structures of our interpersonal relations, and the kinds of agents these relations make us. Such a conception respects the interpersonal foundations of human agency. It also allows us to draw morally significant connections between diverse species of unfreedom—between, for instance, localized domination and structural oppression.
Categories
No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
2168-9105  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LAWAIS
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-02-13
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Making It Explicit.Levi, Isaac & Brandom, Robert B.
Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.Sandel, Michael; Macintyre, Alasdair; Barber, Benjamin & Taylor, Charles

View all 44 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-10-16

Total views
79 ( #30,763 of 43,699 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
44 ( #16,724 of 43,699 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.