The Illusion Probem: a brief introduction and defense of Keith Frankish’s illusionist theory

Abstract

In this work, we introduce what we believe to be a more sensitive variation of the Metaproblem of consciousness, structured by philosopher Keith Frankish (2017): the Illusion Problem. To do so, we explore the process that leads us to treat each and every quale as an illusion, in addition to showing how qualia are present in most supposedly physicalist theories, which we will later call “Closeted Dualism”. We also emphasize that the illusionist theory is already widely used or considered by philosophers who seek a scientifically plausible way out of the problems of consciousness. Once done, the reader will be ready for the more “technical” part of this article, in which we explore and defend the main concepts and mechanisms of Illusionism.

Author Profiles

Gustavo Leal-Toledo
Federal University Of São João Del-Rei
Maria Luiza Iennaco
University of São Paulo

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2023-05-01

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