No-futurism and Metaphysical Contingentism

Axiomathes 24 (4):483-497 (2014)
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Abstract
According to no-futurism, past and present entities are real, but future ones are not. This view faces a skeptical challenge (Bourne 2002, 2006, Braddon-Mitchell, 2004): if no-futurism is true, how do you know you are present? I shall propose a new skeptical argument based on the physical possibility of Gödelian worlds (1949). This argument shows that a no-futurist has to endorse a metaphysical contingentist reading of no-futurism, the view that no-futurism is contingently true. But then, the no-futurist has to face a new skeptical challenge: how do you know that you are in a no-futurist world?
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First archival date: 2014-05-05
Latest version: 3 (2016-04-16)
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Word and Object.Quine, Willard Van Orman

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L'éternité sans le temps.Le Bihan, Baptiste
Qu'est-ce que le temps ?Le Bihan, Baptiste
Getting tense about relativity.Read, James & Qureshi-Hurst, Emily

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2014-05-05

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