Do Particularists Have a Coherent Notion of a Reason for Action?

Ethics 122 (4):763-772 (2012)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Selim Berker argues that particularists do not have a coherent notion of reasons for action because they cannot show that contributory reasons always contribute to overall reason or moral judgments in accordance with their valence. I argue that Berker fails to demonstrate that particularists cannot show this to be the case. He also wrongly assumes that they need to know this to be the case to legitimately speak of reasons for action. Furthermore, Jonathan Dancy’s account of practical reasoning explains how particularists can legitimately speak of reasons for action while claiming that reasons sometimes make contributions contrary to their valence.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LECDPH
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-11-05
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Particular Reasons.Selim Berker - 2007 - Ethics 118 (1):109-139.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Moral Particularism and Moral Generalism.Ridge, Michael & McKeever, Sean

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2012-08-25

Total views
232 ( #19,112 of 50,387 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #23,425 of 50,387 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.