Perceptual presence

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):482-502 (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Plausibly, any adequate theory of perception must (a) solve what Alva Noë calls 'the problem of perceptual presence,' and (b) do justice to the direct realist idea that what is given in perception are garden-variety spatiotemporal particulars. This paper shows that, while Noë's sensorimotor view arguably satisfies the first of these conditions, it does not satisfy the second. Moreover, Noë is wrong to think that a naïve realist approach to perception cannot handle the problem of perceptual presence. Section three of this paper develops a version of naïve realism that meets both of the adequacy conditions above. This paper thus provides strong considerations in favor of naïve realism.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LEDPP
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-08-31
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 23 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
What We Hear.Leddington, Jason
On Perceptual Presence.Laasik, Kristjan

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2009-11-12

Total views
700 ( #3,246 of 40,753 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
105 ( #4,253 of 40,753 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.