Dialogical Answerability and Autonomy Ascription

Hypatia 37 (1):97-110 (2022)
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Ascribing autonomous status to agents is a valuable practice. As such, we ought to care about how we engage in practices of autonomy ascription. However, disagreement between first-personal experiences of an agent's autonomy and third-personal determinations of their autonomy presents challenges of ethical and epistemic concern. My view is that insights from a dialogical rather than nondialogical account of autonomy give us the resources to combat the challenges associated with autonomy ascription. I draw on Andrea Westlund's account of dialogical autonomy—on which autonomy requires a dialogical disposition to hold oneself answerable to external critical perspectives—to make my case.
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Archival date: 2022-03-22
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