Experiences and their Parts

In Bennett Hill (ed.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. MIT Press (2015)
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Abstract
I give an account of the difference between "Holistic" and "Atomistic" views of conscious experience. On the Holistic view, we enjoy a unified "field" of awareness, whose parts are mere modifications of the whole, and therefore owe their existence to the whole. There is some tendency to saddle those who reject the Holistic field model with a (perhaps) implausible "building block" view. I distinguish a number of different theses about the parts of an experience that are suggested by the "building block" metaphor, but which can be rejected by those who also reject the holistic field view.
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Archival date: 2013-06-25
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The Spatial Structure of Unified Consciousness.Bartek Chomanski - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Miami

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