Metaethical Experientialism

In Geoffrey Lee & Adam Pautz (eds.), The Importance of Being Conscious. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
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I develop and defend metaethical experientialism, the thesis that phenomenal facts explain certain kinds of value facts. I argue, for example, that anyone who knows what it’s like to feel extreme pain is in a position to know that that kind of experience is bad. I argue that metaethical experientialism yields genuine counterexamples to the principle that no ethical conclusion can be derived from purely descriptive premises. I also discuss the prospects for a pluralistic metaethics, whereby different metaethical theories hold for different classes of ethical facts.

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Andrew Y. Lee
University of Toronto, St. George Campus


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