Stakes-Shifting Cases Reconsidered—What Shifts? Epistemic Standards or Position?

Logos and Episteme 11 (1):53-76 (2020)
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Abstract
It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our intuitions regarding stakes-shifting cases. I argue that the only way to preserve our initial intuitions regarding such cases is to endorse position variantism, the view that one’s epistemic position may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Some had argued that epistemic position is incompatible with intellectualism. In reply, I point out that position variantism and intellectualism are compatible, if one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p can vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way.
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Archival date: 2020-11-13
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