Sachverhalte und Extensionalität in der freien Logik

Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag (2006)
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Abstract
Empty individual expressions are needed to reconstruct the actual use of scientific language as well as to make logic free from existence assumptions. According to Quine, a language must be extensional to be adequate for the purposes of science. By means of Lambert's non-extensionality argument it can be demonstrated that a language containing empty individual expressions cannot be extensional as long as truth-values are the extensions of sentences. This book investigates the soundness of Lambert's argument and examines the question of whether and how extensionality of a language for free logic can be secured. To achieve these aims, the notion of extensionality is thoroughly analyzed and two new semantic approaches to free logic are developed in which states of affairs, but not truth-values, are the extensions of sentences. These two semantic approaches are defended against the slingshot argument. In this way, two possible solutions to the problem of extensionality arise which use non-existent objects in two different ways: whereas in dual domain semantics non-existent objects serve as referents of empty singular terms, in single domain semantics they serve as hole marker objects that mark the holes in states of affairs where an object is missing due to an irreferental individual expression.
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