“Things Unreasonably Compulsory”: A Peircean Challenge to a Humean Theory of Perception, Particularly With Respect to Perceiving Necessary Truths
Cognitio 15 (1):89-112 (2014)
Abstract
Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume’s (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce’s theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume’s theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate a proof in mathematics.
Keywords
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LEGTUC
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-05-30
View upload history
View upload history

No references found.

Thinking About Events: A Pragmatist Account of the Objects of Episodic Hypothetical Thought.André Sant’Anna & Kourken Michaelian - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-31.
Perception Pragmatized: A Pragmatic Reconciliation of Representationalism and Relationalism.Sant’Anna, André
Added to PP index
2014-05-30
Total downloads
237 ( #10,938 of 37,125 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #7,309 of 37,125 )
2014-05-30
Total downloads
237 ( #10,938 of 37,125 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
48 ( #7,309 of 37,125 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.