From emotions to desires
European Review of Philosophy 5:109-136 (2002)
Abstract
In this paper, I defend the view that our knowledge of our desires is inferential and based on the consciousness we have of our emotions, and on our experiences of pain and pleasure.
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Archival date: 2012-07-13
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2009-01-28
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2009-01-28
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247 ( #17,533 of 48,822 )
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23 ( #28,814 of 48,822 )
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