Facing Up to David Chalmers’ Philosophy of Mind: the General Overview

Philosophical Thought 1 (1):1-12 (2017)
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According to Tim Crane, “the ’hard problem’ of consciousness is supposed to be the real heart of the mind-body problem in today’s philosophy”. The idea of the problem can be expressed in the following way: Why are the physical processes in our brain accompanied by the qualitative (or phenomenal) feel? The mere qualitative feel or qualia are those to be explained. The originator of the problem’s name is the Australian philosopher David Chalmers who divided the problems of consciousness into the ‘easy’ problems and the ‘hard’ problem. The former are ‘easy’ because they can be functionally explained. The ‘hard’ problem, in its turn, cannot. From this, it follows that the explanation of the hard problem of consciousness must be found elsewhere. Chalmers’ nonreductive theory of consciousness (or naturalistic dualism) is a serious candidate for a such-like explanation. In general, it suggests conscious experience as one of the fundamental features of our world, together with such fundamental world features as mass, charge etc. It is a general overview of David Chalmers’ philosophy of mind that is carrying out in the proposed paper. Key words: the ‘easy’ problems and the ‘hard’ problem of consciousness, the phenomenal and psychological concepts of mind, awareness, experience, something it is like, qualia, supervenience, zombie, naturalistic dualism, the principle of structural coherence, the principle of organizational invariance, the double-aspect theory of information.
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Epiphenomenal Qualia.Jackson, Frank
Zombies and Consciousness.Kirk, Robert (ed.)

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