Danto on Knowledge as a Relation

Analysis 30 (4):132 - 134 (1970)
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Abstract

Arthur Danto claims that knowing that S is not a property of some individual knower M but a relation between M and some object O in the world, where O is what makes S true. For if knowledge were a property of M it would be possible to determine whether M knew simply by examining M, which is typically not the case (i.e. unless S happens to be about M). I argue that Danto errs in: (1) claiming that we can determine whether or not some assertion S is true only by observing the truth conditions for S; (2) claiming that we cannot determine whether s is true by examining M; and (3) claiming that since the statement that M knows that S ‘says something about both M and the world’ it must assert a relation between M and the world.

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