A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility

Philosophy of Science 84 (4):613-638 (2017)
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Abstract
We use a theorem from M. J. Schervish to explore the relationship between accuracy and practical success. If an agent is pragmatically rational, she will quantify the expected loss of her credence with a strictly proper scoring rule. Which scoring rule is right for her will depend on the sorts of decisions she expects to face. We relate this pragmatic conception of inaccuracy to the purely epistemic one popular among epistemic utility theorists.
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Archival date: 2017-11-04
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2017-09-14

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