Models, Fictions, and Realism: Two Packages

Philosophy of Science 79 (5):738-748 (2012)
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Some philosophers of science – the present author included – appeal to fiction as an interpretation of the practice of modeling. This raises the specter of an incompatibility with realism, since fiction-making is essentially non-truth-regulated. I argue that the prima facie conflict can be resolved in two ways, each involving a distinct notion of fiction and a corresponding formulation of realism. The main goal of the paper is to describe these two packages. Toward the end I comment on how to choose among them.

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Arnon Levy
Hebrew University of Jerusalem


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