Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity

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Abstract
Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.
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2017
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LEVPRA-7
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Archival date: 2017-09-04
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Deference and Uniqueness.Meacham, Christopher J. G.

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2015-08-09

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