The modal status of materialism

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362 (2009)
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Abstract
Materialism, as traditionally conceived, has a contingent side and a necessary side. The necessity of materialism is reflected by the metaphysics of realization, while its contingency is a matter of accepting the possibility of Cartesian worlds, worlds in which our minds are roughly as Descartes describes them. In this paper we argue that the necessity and the contingency of materialism are in conflict. In particular, we claim that if mental properties are realized by physical properties in the actual world, Cartesian worlds are impossible.
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Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation.Chalmers, David J. & Jackson, Frank

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2009-01-28

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