Why cognitivism?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244 (2018)
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Abstract
Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge'. In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.
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2017, 2018
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LEVWC-3
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Archival date: 2017-06-11
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References found in this work BETA
Why Be Rational?Kolodny, Niko
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Velleman, J. David & Bratman, Michael E.

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2017-06-11

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