Why It Is Sometimes Fair to Blame Agents for Unavoidable Actions and Omissions

American Philosophical Quarterly 42 (2):93 - 104 (2005)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It is generally thought that ought implies can. If this maxim is correct, then my inability to do otherwise entails that I cannot be blamed for failing to do otherwise. In this article, however, I use Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the "Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (PAP) to show that the maxim is actually false, that I can be blamed for failing to do otherwise even in situations where I could not have done otherwise. In these situations, I do not act otherwise not because I cannot act otherwise but because I choose not to act otherwise.None
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LEVWII-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-09-16
View other versions
Added to PP index
2011-05-29

Total views
321 ( #14,836 of 52,730 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #23,680 of 52,730 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.