Conhecimento humano e a ideia de afecção na Ética de Espinosa

Analytica (Rio) 17 (2): 221-247 (2013)
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Abstract
A tese de que o conceito espinosista de ideia de afecção, introduzido na Ética, expressa o sentido mais preciso do que seja, para o autor, o conceito de ideia da imaginação. Este texto pretende problematizar essa leitura, procurando fornecer subsídios para a hipótese de que ela não é nem inequivocamente corroborada pelo texto da Ética, nem exigida pela doutrina aí apresentada. It is widely accepted by scholars that Spinoza’s concept of idea of affection, introduced in the Ethics, states his notion of the idea of imagination. In this paper I address this reading, claiming that it is not either unequivocally corroborated by the text of the Ethics, or required by the doctrine developed there.
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