Sceptical Thoughts on Philosophical Expertise

Logos and Episteme 3 (3):449-458 (2012)
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Abstract
My topic is two-fold: a reductive account of expertise as an epistemic phenomenon, and applying the reductive account to the question of whether or not philosophers enjoy expertise. I conclude, on the basis of the reductive account, that even though philosophers enjoy something akin to second-order expertise (i.e. they are often experts on the positions of other philosophers, current trends in the philosophical literature, the history of philosophy, conceptual analysis and so on), they nevertheless lack first-order philosophical expertise (i.e. expertise on philosophical positions themselves such as the nature of mind, causality, normativity and so forth). Throughout the paper, I respond to potential objections.
ISBN(s)
2069-0533  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LICSTO
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Archival date: 2012-10-09
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.
What Experts Could Not Be.Watson, Jamie Carlin

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2012-10-10

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