Companions in guilt: entailment, analogy, and absorbtion

In Christopher Cowie & Richard Rowland (eds.), Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics. Routledge (2019)
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In this paper, I do three things. First, I say what I mean by a ‘companions in guilt’ argument in meta-ethics. Second, I distinguish between two kinds of argument within this family, which I call ‘arguments by entailment’ and ‘arguments by analogy’. Third, I explore the prospects for companions in guilt arguments by analogy. During the course of this discussion, I identify a distinctive variety of argument, which I call ‘arguments by absorption’. I argue that this variety of argument inherits some of the weaknesses of standard arguments by analogy and entailment without obviously adding to their strength.
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First archival date: 2018-07-15
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