Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism

In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York, USA: Routledge (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. The first is the suspicion that in making moral claims we are merely projecting our attitudes onto the world. The second is the suspicion that in arguing for and against moral views we are merely attempting to influence each other to give similar answers to questions that have no determinate answer.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LILPIA
Revision history
Archival date: 2017-01-17
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Justice for Hedgehogs.Dworkin, Ronald
The Myth of Morality.Joyce, Richard

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-01-17

Total views
157 ( #20,345 of 43,009 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
57 ( #11,248 of 43,009 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.