Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism

In Diego Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York, USA: Routledge (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. In this paper I argue that constructivism is both compatible with, and in certain cases explanatory of, some of the allegedly mistaken commitments to which arguments for moral skepticism appeal. I focus on two particular allegations that are sometimes associated with moral skepticism. The first is the suspicion that in making moral claims we are merely projecting our attitudes onto the world. The second is the suspicion that in arguing for and against moral views we are merely attempting to influence each other to give similar answers to questions that have no determinate answer.

Author's Profile

Hallvard Lillehammer
Birkbeck College, University Of London

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-01-17

Downloads
458 (#18,487)

6 months
23 (#43,405)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?