Revisionary dispositionalism and practical reason

The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):173-190 (2000)
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This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms.
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