Functional Constitutivism’s Misunderstood Resources: A Limited Defense of Smith’s Constitutivism

Ethics 130 (1):79-91 (2019)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In recent work, Michael Smith argues that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency and draws on his dispositional account of reasons to establish the normative significance of those desires. In a sustained critique, Michael Bukowski objects that Smith’s recent arguments that particular desires are constitutive of ideal agency rely on indefensible premises and his dispositional account of reasons is unable to establish the normative significance of such desires. On the contrary, I argue not only that Smith has the resources to respond to these objections but also that the form of Smith’s constitutivist explanation has unappreciated explanatory strengths.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LINFCM
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-06-20
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-06-20

Total views
226 ( #27,502 of 2,448,668 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
34 ( #19,624 of 2,448,668 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.