A Passage Theory of Time

In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 11. Oxford University Press. pp. 95-122 (2018)
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Abstract
This paper proposes a view of time that takes passage to be the most basic temporal notion, instead of the usual A-theoretic and B-theoretic notions, and explores how we should think of a world that exhibits such a genuine temporal passage. It will be argued that an objective passage of time can only be made sense of from an atemporal point of view and only when it is able to constitute a genuine change of objects across time. This requires that passage can flip one fact into a contrary fact, even though neither side of the temporal passage is privileged over the other. We can make sense of this if the world is inherently perspectival. Such an inherently perspectival world is characterized by fragmentalism, a view that has been introduced by Fine in his ‘Tense and Reality’ (2005). Unlike Fine's tense-theoretic fragmentalism though, the proposed view will be a fragmentalist view based in a primitive notion of passage.
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Archival date: 2016-12-09
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No Ground for Doomsday.Roberto Loss - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-21.

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