Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
AbstractThere is a type of metaphysical picture that surfaces in a range of philosophical discussions, is of intrinsic interest and yet remains ill-understood. According to this picture, the world contains a range of standpoints relative to which different facts obtain. Any true representation of the world cannot but adopt a particular standpoint. The aim of this paper is to propose a regimentation of a metaphysics that underwrites this picture. Key components are a factive notion of metaphysical relativity, a deflationary notion of adopting standpoints and two kinds of valid inference, one that allows one to abandon standpoints and one that doesn’t. To better understand how theories formulated in terms of this framework are situated in dialectical space, I sketch a theory in the philosophy of time that admits both temporal and atemporal standpoints.
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