Cut-off points for the rational believer

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I show that the Lottery Paradox is just a (probabilistic) Sorites, and argue that this should modify our way of looking at the Paradox itself. In particular, I focus on what I call “the cut-off point problem” and contend that this problem, well known by students of the Sorites, ought to play a key role in the debate on Kyburg’s puzzle.
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LISCPF
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-02-17
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-02-17

Total views
88 ( #35,685 of 51,477 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
88 ( #5,468 of 51,477 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.