Deliberation, single-peakedness, and the possibility of meaningful democracy: evidence from deliberative polls

Journal of Politics 75 (1):80–95 (2013)
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Abstract
Majority cycling and related social choice paradoxes are often thought to threaten the meaningfulness of democracy. But deliberation can prevent majority cycles – not by inducing unanimity, which is unrealistic, but by bringing preferences closer to single-peakedness. We present the first empirical test of this hypothesis, using data from Deliberative Polls. Comparing preferences before and after deliberation, we find increases in proximity to single-peakedness. The increases are greater for lower versus higher salience issues and for individuals who seem to have deliberated more versus less effectively. They are not merely a byproduct of increased substantive agreement. Our results both refine and support the idea that deliberation, by increasing proximity to single-peakedness, provides an escape from the problem of majority cycling.
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References found in this work BETA
Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Quine, Willard V. O.
On the Logic of Theory Change: Partial Meet Contraction and Revision Functions.Alchourrón, Carlos E.; Gärdenfors, Peter & Makinson, David
Democracy and Disagreement.Gutmann, Amy & Thompson, Dennis

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Citations of this work BETA
The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy.Mansbridge, Jane; Bohman, James; Chambers, Simone; Estlund, David; Føllesdal, Andreas; Fung, Archon; Lafont, Cristina; Manin, Bernard & Martí, José Luis
Where Do Preferences Come From?Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian
Aggregating Causal Judgments.Bradley, Richard; Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian
A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change.Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian

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