Freedom as Independence

Ethics 126 (4):1043–1074 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Much recent philosophical work on social freedom focuses on whether freedom should be understood as non-interference, in the liberal tradition associated with Isaiah Berlin, or as non-domination, in the republican tradition revived by Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner. We defend a conception of freedom that lies between these two alternatives: freedom as independence. Like republican freedom, it demands the robust absence of relevant constraints on action. Unlike republican, and like liberal freedom, it is not moralized. We show that freedom as independence retains the virtues of its liberal and republican counterparts while shedding their vices. Our aim is to put this conception of freedom more firmly on the map and to offer a novel perspective on the logical space in which different conceptions of freedom are located.
Reprint years
2014, 2016
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LISFAI
Revision history
Archival date: 2020-05-25
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Republicanism.Lovett, Frank
Freedom From Fear.Goodin, Robert E. & Jackson, Frank

View all 8 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-09-29

Total views
264 ( #17,007 of 50,312 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #11,598 of 50,312 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.